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1  INTRODUCTION 
Regional integration measures are 
largely seen as a vehicle for 
development. The African regional 
integration project has been in existence 
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 DEMOCRACY  
& DEVELOPMENT 
VOLUME 19 (2015) 
 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/ldd.v19i1.9   
ISSN:  2077-4907 
Page | 175  
 
                                                 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM IN SADC 
 
for decades, with the African Union (AU) seen as the primary driver of continental 
integration. Together with seven other sub-regional institutions,1 the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) is regarded as a “building block” of regional 
integration in Africa. The expectation is that these eight regional economic communities 
(RECs) will eventually harmonise all their structures and policies under the banner of 
the AU, and then achieve continental integration in Africa. 2 
It is in this context that the SADC has put in place a number of policies and 
structures aimed at deepening integration in the region. An example of this is the SADC 
Protocol on Finance and Investment (FIP), which requires Member States to harmonise 
their investment policies, laws and practices with the objective of creating a SADC 
investment zone.3 The FIP was signed on 18 August 2006, and came into effect on 16 
April 2010.4 An issue which arises is the level of progress that has been made by SADC 
Member States towards the harmonisation of their policies, laws, and practices, 
especially as they relate to the resolution of investor-State disputes in accordance with 
the FIP.5 At present, there are major differences between the investment policies, laws 
and practices of SADC Member States. A case in point is the Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution Forum. In this regard, the FIP provides that investors must be given access 
to local courts, as well as access to international arbitration after the exhaustion of local 
remedies.6 Furthermore, in 2012, the SADC introduced the Model Bilateral Investment 
Treaty Template (Model BIT) with a view to further foster the harmonisation of 
investment laws and practice at BIT level. However, the FIP and the Model BIT differ 
significantly with regards inter alia to their provisions for the resolution of investor-
state disputes, with major implications for harmonisation.7 Probably due to this and 
 
1 These are: The Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-CAD); The Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD); Arab Maghreb Union (UMA). For more information see, for example, 
http://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/african-union-au-regional-economic-communities-recs-africa and 
http://www.au.int/en/, and select the “REC’s” link (accessed 26 August 2014). 
2 See Article 3(l) of the African Union Constitutive Act.  
3 Art 19 Annex 1 FIP. The FIP is available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1009 
(accessed 10 August 2014).  
4 See http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/show/1009 (accessed 10 August 2014). The delay in 
the coming into effect of the FIP was due to the slow pace of the ratification by Member States. Article 29 
of the FIP requires ratification by two-thirds of all Member States.  
5 The investor-state dispute resolution measures which are the focus of this article relate to the pre-
conditions to be met prior to commencement of arbitration or litigation, as well as the forum for the 
resolution of the dispute. These are dealt with under Article 27 and 28 of the FIP, and Articles 28 and 29 
of the SADC Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template. Available at http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf (accessed 10 August 2014). 
6 Art 27 and 28 Annex 1 FIP. 
7 The differences are outlined in Section 2.2 below.  
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other reasons, the FIP is in the process of being amended.8 Currently, while a few States 
are compliant with the FIP, in terms of investor-State dispute resolution, the investment 
policies and laws of other Member States remain in conflict with the FIP.9 Furthermore, 
South Africa is moving away from international arbitration.10 Some States such as 
Lesotho, are working on new investment policies, and others, such as Namibia, are 
revising existing policies. Mauritius and South Africa have completed their policy 
reviews.  
  The thrust of this article is consideration of the feasibility of the effective 
harmonisation of investment laws and policies in the SADC region, particularly within 
the context of the Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum. In other words, is the 
creation of a SADC investment zone possible considering the factors on the ground? In 
order to address this, the article looks at some of the amendments that should be made 
to the FIP, the extent of alignment between the FIP, the Model BIT and national 
investment codes, and the level of political will necessary for such harmonisation.  
The article begins with an overview of the FIP and Model BIT frameworks. It 
then provides an outline of the current State practice in the SADC in terms of the 
Investor-State Dispute Resolution Forum. It concludes by looking at some of the 
politico-legal measures that should be adopted in order to ensure the effective 
harmonisation of investment laws and policies in the SADC. 
 
2  THE FIP AND THE MODEL BIT: AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 The FIP 
The FIP is a subsidiary instrument formed under the auspices of the SADC Treaty.11 The 
objective of the FIP is to “foster harmonisation of the financial and investment policies 
of the State Parties in order to make them consistent with objectives of SADC and 
ensure that any changes to financial and investment policies in one State Party do not 
necessitate undesirable adjustments in other State Parties”. 12  
8 We requested details of the amendments from the SADC but were advised that the details are 
confidential at this stage. Therefore, we can only speculate on what aspects of investor-state dispute 
resolution may be amended. 
9 See the discussion in Section 3 below. 
10 See for example “Bilateral investment treaty policy review: Government Position Paper.” Available at 
http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/docs/090626trade-bi-lateralpolicy.pdf 
(accessed 4 September 2014). As a result of this policy, the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 
of 1 November 2013, does not provide for international arbitration of investoe-State disputes.  For a 
recent version of the Bill see http://www.thedti.gov.za/business_regulation/bills/Investment2015.pdf 
(accessed 22 December 2015). 
11 The FIP was formed in terms of Articles 21 and 22 of the SADC Treaty. For a copy of the SADC Treaty 
see http://www.sadc.int/documents-publications/sadc-treaty/ (accessed 12 August 2014).  
12 Art 2(1) Annex 1 FIP. Emphasis added. 
Page | 177  
 
                                                 
INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUM IN SADC 
 
One of the ways in which the FIP seeks to achieve this objective is by creating a 
favourable investment environment within the SADC, with the aim of attracting and 
promoting investment.13 The FIP thus fosters the creation of a SADC investment zone 
with a common Regional Investment Policy Framework.14 Towards this end, Article 19 
of Annex 1 of the FIP anticipates that Member States’ investment policies, laws and 
practices shall converge into a single investment regime applicable across the 
anticipated SADC investment zone.15 This implies that the presently divergent state 
policies, laws and practices must gradually change so as to converge into a single 
regional regime agreed to by Member States.16 The Baseline Summary describes the 
harmonisation process as follows: 
Focus shifts from individual Member States to the region. Agreement is reached on 
harmonised standards, systems and policies. Through domestic adoption of these, 
individual domestic frameworks start to look and function the same. At the end of this 
phase, all domestic frameworks are harmonised to a regional standard. 17  
Articles 27 and 28 of Annex 1 of the FIP are central to this article, as they deal with the 
resolution of investor-State disputes in the SADC. Article 27 of Annex 1 provides that 
States must provide investors with a right of access to the courts for the resolution of 
investment-related grievances.18 Article 28 of Annex 1 provides that in the event of an 
investor-State dispute not being resolved amicably, and after the exhaustion of local 
remedies, the dispute shall be resolved by arbitration under either of International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) if one of the parties so elects.19 In this regard, 
it appears from reports that UNCITRAL arbitration has been brought against Lesotho by 
13 Art 2(2)(a) Annex 1 FIP. The other ways of achieving this objective are listed in Articles 2(2)(c)-(n) of 
the FIP. Annex 1 of the FIP deals with the harmonisation of the investment regime in SADC, and is the 
focus of this article. 
14 See the report “Striving for Regional Integration: Baseline Study on the Implementation of the SADC 
Protocol on Finance and Investment” (Baseline Summary) at 4. Available at 
http://www.giz.de/en/downloads/giz2012-en-implementation-sadc-finance-investment.pdf (accessed 2 
September 2014). This report is a summary of the main study, “Protocol on Finance and Investment 
Baseline Study: Regional Report August 2011” (“Baseline Regional Report”). Available at 
http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/pubs/SADC-FIP-Baseline-Study-Regional-Summary-
Report-Final-5-August-20113.pdf (accessed 2 September 2014). 
15 See also Baseline Summary at 4, Table 1, in the section where Article 19 is referred to. 
16 The Baseline Summary states that the Regional Investment Policy Framework will be drafted by 
Member States (at 4 Table 1). This is also supported by the first objective of the FIP, which in terms of 
Article 2(1) is to “… foster harmonisation of the financial and investment policies of the State Parties in 
order to make them consistent with objectives of SADC…”  
17 Baseline Summary at 3.  
18 Art 27 Annex 1 FIP. This Article uses the term “grievance”, not “dispute”. 
19 Art 28 Annex 1 FIP. 
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Swissbourgh Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd, in a matter which has unsuccessfully spanned 
the courts of Lesotho, South Africa and the SADC Tribunal since 1991.20 
 
2.2 The Model BIT 
Article 28 of the Model BIT provides for the resolution of disputes between States, 
relating to the Model BIT. More specifically, it provides that a State may bring ICSID or 
UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings against a host State on behalf of its national who 
suffered loss as a result of the actions of the host State.21 Article 29 of the Model BIT is 
the provision that deals with the resolution of investor-State disputes. It provides the 
pre-conditions for arbitration,22 as well as details of the arbitration forum and 
arbitration rules.23 Although both the FIP and the Model BIT deal with the resolution of 
investor-State disputes, they differ in some fundamental respects, as shown below.  
First, in terms of Article 28 of the Model BIT, a SADC State can bring arbitration 
proceedings against another SADC state on behalf of an investor who is its national, 
while the FIP does not provide for this.24  
   Secondly, unlike the FIP, the Model BIT does not make investor-state 
international arbitration a mandatory provision in a BIT.25 It acknowledges that some 
states, such as South Africa, may not wish to utilise international arbitration. This point 
is further buttressed by State practice in the region. As investment codes show, the 
majority of SADC States do not prefer international arbitration, since only a third of 
SADC states provide for international arbitration.26  
20 See http://www.italaw.com/cases/2256 (accessed 20 September 2014). Details of this matter are not 
available, partly because this being an UNCITRAL ad hoc arbitration, there is often a veil of secrecy 
around the proceedings, in addition to it not being known where the proceedings are opened. The amount 
being claimed in the last proceedings before the SADC Tribunal was R1.3 billion (SADC Tribunal Case No 
SADC (T) 04/2009). The proceedings were aborted due to the suspension of the SADC Tribunal. See Rupel 
C “SADC environmental law and the promotion of sustainable development” (2012) 2 SADC Law Journal at 
268. For the last judgment issued by the South African Supreme Court of Appeal, and which gives a 
detailed presentation of the history of the case see 
http://www.justice.gov.za/sca/judgments%5Csca_2007/sca07-109.pdf (accessed 20 September 2014). 
The case is reported as Van Zyl and others v Government of Republic of South Africa and Others [2007] SCA 
109 (RSA).  
21 Arts 28(3)(a), 28(5) and 28(9) Model BIT.  
22 Art 29(4) Model BIT. 
23 Arts 29(5) - 29(20) Model BIT. 
24 Art 28(3)(a) Model BIT.  
25 See Special Note to Article 29 which states  
“The Drafting Committee was of the view that the preferred option is not to include investor-
State dispute settlement. Several States are opting out or looking at opting out of investor-State 
mechanisms, including Australia, South Africa and others. However, if a State does decide to 
negotiate and include this, the text below provides comprehensive guidance for this purpose”.  
26 See Section 3 below. 
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   Thirdly, unlike the FIP, Article 29(6) of the Model BIT provides for regional and 
other arbitration forums in addition to ICSID and UNCITRAL arbitration. The provision 
for additional forums is commendable, given that not all SADC States are Members of 
the ICSID Convention, which in turn makes ICSID arbitration unavailable to investors 
from non-ICSID Member States.27  
   Fourthly, unlike the FIP, Article 29(4)(d) of the Model BIT introduces the defence 
of prescription of claims after a period of three years from  
[T]he date on which the Investor first acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge 
of the breach alleged in the Notice of Arbitration and knowledge that the Investor has 
incurred loss or damage, or one year from the conclusion of the request for local 
remedies initiated in the domestic courts.  
Prescription is a welcome provision, because it ensures that disputes between parties 
do not remain hanging perpetually.28  
   Fifthly, unlike the FIP, Article 29(4)(b)(1)(i) of the Model BIT introduces the 
requirement than an investor must first exhaust administrative remedies, followed by 
local remedies in the host State. Furthermore, where local remedies are commenced, an 
investor may only commence arbitration proceedings where “…a resolution has not 
been reached within a reasonable period of time from its submission to a local court of 
the Host State.” It is submitted that this provision is potentially problematic, mainly 
because there is nothing in the Model BIT to indicate a reasonable period for the 
conclusion of litigation. The delay in the conclusion of litigation in some SADC Member 
States remains a worrying concern. For example, according to the American Department 
of State Investment Climate Statement, it takes about four years for an investment 
matter to be finalised in Angolan courts.29 The Statement reports in this regard 
The Angolan justice system is slow, arduous, and not always impartial. Legal fees are 
high, and most businesses avoid taking commercial disputes to court. The World Bank’s 
Doing Business in 2014 survey ranks Angola at 187 out of 189 on contract enforcement, 
and estimates that commercial contract enforcement, measured by time elapsed 
27 For example Angola and South Africa are not members of the ICSID Convention. 
28 For a recent decision which applied prescription based on Article 1116(2) of the NAFTA treaty, which 
also provides for prescription of claims after expiry of three years, see Apotex Inc. v. The Government of 
the United States of America (UNCITRAL), Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 14 June 2013 at 99 
para 300 -110 para 335. Article 1117(2) of the NAFTA Treaty. Available at https://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/Default.aspx?tabid=97&language=en-US), Article 26(1) of the USA Model BIT 2012. Available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf (accessed 5 
August 2014)), and Articles 23(2) and 26(1)(b) and 26(2)(c) of the Canada Model BIT 2004. Available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf (accessed on 5 August 2014)) also 
provide for prescription of claims after three years. 
29 The USA Department of State Investment Climate Statement 2014 on Angola at 4. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228974.pdf (accessed 4 September 2014). Reports for 
other SADC States are available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/index.htm (accessed 4 
September 2014). 
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between filing a complaint and receiving restitution, takes an average of 1,296 days, at 
an average cost of 44.4 per cent of the claim.30 
On Zambia, the Statement observes: “The Zambian judicial system has a mixed record in 
upholding the sanctity of contracts. The judicial process is lengthy and inefficient. Many 
magistrates lack experience in commercial matters.” 31  The Statement expresses a 
similar view regarding Mozambique  
Recourse to the judicial system in Mozambique can present many obstacles for potential 
investors. Generally, the Mozambican judicial system is largely ineffective in resolving 
commercial disputes and certain cases consume a large amount of time and resources. 
Instead, most disputes among Mozambican parties are either settled privately or not at 
all, and there are no discernible patterns to resolution of investment disputes. 32 
 
These points highlight the imperativeness of stipulating a timeframe for the conclusion 
of local proceedings, which is more objective and can easily be determined from the 
language of a provision.33 In addition, they highlight the challenges of corruption, delays 
in finalising cases, high litigation costs, inefficiency and lack of political independence. It 
is submitted that these challenges will need to be addressed in order to secure investor 
confidence, especially in the event that international arbitration is removed from the 
FIP, because local courts will then be the only forum for the resolution of investor-State 
disputes.34  
Sixthly, unlike the FIP, Article 29(4)(c) of the Model BIT introduces a “fork-in-the 
road” provision. This implies that once an investor chooses a forum to resolve a dispute, 
he or she may not, thereafter, approach another forum for the resolution of the same 
dispute.35  
30 Angola Investment Climate Statement 2014 at 4. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/228974.pdf (accessed 4 September 2014). 
31 Zambia Investment Climate Statement 2013 at 1. Available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204763.htm (accessed 4 September 2014). 
32 Mozambique Investment Climate Statement 2014 at 7.  Available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/227422.pdf (accessed 4 September 2014). 
33 The use of clear language in a treaty is important, as it assists in the interpretation of a treaty in the 
event of a dispute. In terms of Art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 
“(a) A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.  
34 Of course those investors who are covered by applicable BITS between their home States and the host 
State may still be access international arbitration via the BITS. Similarly, investors who are covered by 
investment agreements with host States may be able to access international arbitration via the 
investment agreements. 
35Arts 1121(1)(b) and 1121(2)(b) of the NAFTA, Art 26(2) of the USA Model BIT, and Art 26)(1)(e) of the 
Canada Model BIT contain similar provisions.   
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Seventhly, unlike the FIP, Articles 28(12) and 29(17)(b) of the Model BIT provide 
that arbitration hearings are to be open to the public, and may be broadcast live via the 
internet.36  
Eighthly, Articles 28(10) and 29(17)(a) of the Model BIT provide that a State 
Party to an investor-state dispute shall upon receipt of a notice of intention to arbitrate, 
the notice of arbitration and subsequent pleadings, make these publicly available. Again 
this is commendable, as it increases public access to proceedings and in turn, enhances 
transparency. 
Finally, Article 29(3) of the Model BIT provides that a State may, upon receipt of 
a notice from an investor that it wishes to commence arbitration proceedings, propose 
mediation.  
3 AN OUTLINE OF INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION FORUMS IN 
SADC MEMBER STATES  
In the international arena, States are required to settle disputes by peaceful means.37  
Within the SADC region, States are also required to resolve disputes by peaceful 
means.38 As shown above, the FIP and the Model BIT provide for the settlement of 
investor-State disputes through alternative dispute resolution methods,39 arbitration40 
36 However, unlike Article 28(12), Article 29(17)(b) of the Model BIT does not specifically state that 
proceedings may be broadcast live. This literally means that State-State arbitrations can be broadcast live, 
while investor-state arbitrations cannot be broadcast live. It is doubted whether this is the real intent of 
the drafters of the Model BIT. The provisions to open arbitration hearings to the public and to broadcast 
hearings are also contained in Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State 
Arbitrations of 2014.  
37 Art 2(3) United Nations Charter. With regard to the settlement of investment disputes see for example 
UNCTAD “Dispute settlement course 2.2 selecting the appropriate forum” 2003. Available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add1_en.pdf. Accessed 30 August 2014), and see also the 
overview of the UNCTAD course available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232overview_en.pdf 
(accessed 30 August 2014). 
38 Art 4(e) SADC Treaty. In terms of the Treaty SADC Member States are also required to observe human 
rights and the rule of law (Art 4(d)); the sovereignty of other States (Art 4(a); solidarity, peace and 
security (Art 4(b); and equity, balance and mutual benefit (Art 4(d). Art 24 of the FIP provides that 
member states shall “…use their best endeavours, through co-operation and consultation, to achieve 
consensus in the interpretation, application and implementation of this Protocol”. 
39 Art 28(1) Annex 1 FIP; Art 29(1) Model BIT.  For an introduction to alternative dispute resolution see 
UNCTAD “Investor-States disputes: prevention and alternatives to arbitration” 2010, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2014). See also the sequel to this 
publication available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2014). 
For factors which lend momentum to alternative dispute resolution versus arbitration see UNCTAD IIA 
issues Note No. 2  June 2013 “Reform of investor-State dispute settlement: in search of a roadmap.” 
Available at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 
2014). 
40 Art 28 Annex 1 FIP; Art 28 and 29 Model BIT. For an introduction to investor-State arbitration see 
UNCTAD “Dispute settlement 5.1: international commercial arbitration” 2005, available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add38_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2014). For recent arbitration 
statistics see UNCTAD IIA Issues Note No 1 April 2014. Available at 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2014d3_en.pdf (accessed 30 August 2014). For 
ICSID arbitration statistics see 
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and the courts of a host State.41 The Table below provides a summary of the forums for 
investor-State dispute resolution in SADC States. It is based on the investment laws and 
constitutions applicable to general economic sectors in the various states.42 
Table: Investor-state dispute resolution forums in the SADC in terms of internal 
investment codes 





Republic of Angola  Yes43 No44 No 
Republic of Botswana  Yes45 No No 
Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) 
Yes46 No Yes47 
 
ICSID (including Additional Facility) or 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)48  
Kingdom of Lesotho  Yes49 No No 
Republic of Malawi  Yes50 No No 
Republic of Mauritius  Yes51 No No52 
Republic of Mozambique Yes53 Yes54 No ICSID (including Additional Facility) or ICC55  
Republic of Namibia  Yes56 No UNCITRAL57  
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistic
s (accessed 30 August 2014). 
41 Art 28(1) and (2) FIP; Art 28 and 29 Model BIT. 
42 Some SADC States are parties to BITS which have investor-State dispute resolution provisions. Treaties 
are not taken into consideration in this article because their provisions are not available to all investors, 
as intended by the SADC FIP. They are only available to nationals of the member States to the treaty. 
Madagascar is not included in this article as it has just emerged from the suspension of its SADC 
membership.  
43 S 16(1) Basic Law for Private Investment No 20/11 of 20 May 2011. In addition, the rights an investor, 
stemming from a treaty or an investor-state agreement, may also be asserted (s 16(5)). 
44 Angola has recently passed a new investment law in the second half of 2015, of which an English 
version is not yet available. This law is therefore not considered here as it came into being after this 
article was finalised. 
45 Art 8(1)(b)(ii) Constitution of the Republic of Botswana of 1966 as amended to 2002. 
46 Art 38 Investment Code No 004/2002 of 21 February 2002 (English non-official version). 
47 Art 37 Investment Code. 
48 Art 38 Investment Code. 
49 Art 17(2) Constitution of Lesotho of 1993 as amended to 2001. 
50 Art 46 Constitution of the Republic of Malawi of 1994 as amended to 2010. 
51 Ss 8(1)(c)(ii) and 17 Constitution of the Republic of Mauritius of 1968 as amended.   
52 The International Arbitration Act 2008 as amended with effect from 1 June enables and regulates 
international arbitration in Mauritius. It does not however give an investor a right to international 
arbitration. 
53 Ss 25(1)-25(2) Law on Investment No 3/93 of 24th June 1993. 
54 S 25(2) Law on Investment. 
55 S 25(2) Law on Investment. 
56 S 13(4) Foreign Investment Act No 27 of 1990 as amended to 1993. 
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Republic of Seychelles  Yes58 No No 
Republic of South Africa  Pending59 Pending60 Legislation Pending 
Kingdom of Swaziland No Yes61 Yes62 UNCITRAL or ICSID63  
United Republic of Tanzania Yes64 No Yes65 
 
ICSID66  
Republic of Zambia  No Yes67 No 
Republic of Zimbabwe  Yes68 No No 
Source: Authors’ presentation 
The following observations can be deduced from the tabulated summary above. 
(a) Only a few States provide for preventative alternative dispute resolution in their 
investment codes. 
(b) Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
Swaziland, and Zimbabwe provide for the resolution of investor-State disputes 
before local courts.69 Of these states, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, and Zimbabwe do not provide for any other forum as an option.  
(c) Only the DRC, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Swaziland provide for 
international arbitration in their investment codes. Of these five States, the DRC, 
57 Ss 13(1)-(2) Foreign Investment Act. 
58 Art 26(3)(e) Constitution of the Republic of Seychelles of 1993 as amended to 1996. In terms  
of Section 5(3) Seychelles Investment Act 31 of 2010, an investor may access such forum as is indicated 
by law or an investor-state agreement. 
59 The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 (published in the Government Gazette, Vol. 581, 
No 36995 on 01 November 2013) is still going through the parliamentary process. Its provisions are 
therefore not included here. 
60 The Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 provides for local arbitration of disputes. It does not however give an 
investor a right to arbitration. 
61 S 21(a) of the Swaziland Investment Promotion Act 1 of 1998. 
62 S 21(b) of the Swaziland Investment Promotion Act. 
63 S 21(c)-(d) of the Swaziland Investment Promotion Act. 
64 S 23(1) Tanzania Investment Act No 26 of 1997. 
65 S 23(2)(a) Tanzania Investment Act. 
66 S 23(2)(b) Tanzania Investment Act. 
67 S 21 Zambia Development Agency Act No 11 of 2006. The Act in question is the Arbitration Act 19 of 
2000. In terms of s 5(2)(a) and (b) of the Arbitration Act, a provision in a law (such as section 21 of the 
Zambia Development Agency Act in this case) which provides for a dispute to be referred to arbitration, 
amounts to an arbitration agreement, and parties to the dispute who invoke the arbitration provision are 
deemed to be parties to the arbitration agreement. 
68 Ss 71 and 72 Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe of 2013 provide for an investor to approach the 
court regarding compensation for expropriation. However section 72(3) prevents a court from 
adjudicating on a dispute regarding compensation for expropriation of agricultural land (only 
compensation for improvements can be challenged). 
69 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, Swaziland, and 
Zimbabwe. 
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Namibia, and Swaziland provide consent to international arbitration in advance. 
Although Mozambique and Tanzania provide for international arbitration, the 
granting of consent to arbitration is delayed until a dispute arises, and the consent, if 
finally given, must be mutual.70 All the five States which provide for international 
arbitration provide for ICSID arbitration. Only the DRC and Mozambique provide for 
ICSID arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules.71 Only Namibia and Swaziland 
provide for UNCITRAL arbitration. Only the DRC and Mozambique provide for ICC 
arbitration. 
(d) Angola, the DRC, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia provide for local arbitration.72 Of 
these States, Zambia provides local arbitration to the exclusion of local courts and 
international arbitration.73 Angola and Zambia provide for local arbitration to the 
exclusion of international arbitration, while the DRC, Tanzania, and Swaziland 
provide for local arbitration as well as the option of international arbitration.  
It is clear from the above that State practice, as seen in investment codes, is far from 
compliant with the FIP, especially with regard to international arbitration. This thus 
raises the following questions, which States are better placed to answer for themselves: 
Why do so few States provide for international arbitration in their codes, while they 
provide for it in their BITS?74 Are the States providing for international arbitration 
because they favour foreign investors over local investors?75 Is it a burden for States to 
provide for international arbitration? If so, what are the underlining factors? If 
international arbitration is burdensome, will States rid themselves of compliance with 
this requirement by removing mandatory international arbitration from the FIP? Or will 
they retain it for the benefit of all investors in the SADC? This is a policy decision to be 
taken by both States and the SADC. Suffice it to note that effective harmonisation can 
play an important role in eliminating these inconsistencies, and thus provide a more 
conducive environment for trade and investment. The feasibility of effective 
harmonisation is addressed below. 
70 Mozambique and Tanzania. In Mauritius, despite having established the Mauritius International 
Arbitration Centre, neither the Mauritius Investment Protection Act 2000 as amended nor the 
Constitution of 1968 as amended provide for international arbitration. 
71 This helps investors from non-ICSID States such as, Angola and South Africa, as they can access 
Additional Facility arbitration despite their home States not being members (Art 2(a) ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules 2006. Available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-
final.pdf (accessed 10 August 2014). 
72 Angola, DRC, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zambia. 
73 S 21 Zambia Development Agency Act. However, an investor can resort to applicable BITS or an 
investment agreement. 
74 For example, the Mauritius–South Africa BIT. Available at 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1991 (accessed 15 August 2014), 
provides for international arbitration, but the investment codes of these States do not provide for it.  
75 It must be noted that BITs contain more than provisions for international arbitration. They also give 
foreign investors rights which are often not found in investment codes, such as the rights to free and 
equitable treatment, fair administration treatment, most favoured nation treatment, and full protection 
and security (see for example Articles 4, 5 and 9 SADC Model BIT).  
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4 CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF EFFECTIVE HARMONISATION OF 
INVESTMENT LAWS, POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN THE SADC  
There are a number of challenges affecting the feasibility of effective harmonisation of 
investment laws and policies in the SADC.76 The first challenge is whether the FIP must 
provide for international arbitration or not.77 Secondly, there are possible challenges 
caused by the fact that some SADC States are also members of other regional economic 
bodies. This may cause a conflict if the measures which are to be embodied in the FIP 
conflict with those of another regional body.78 Thirdly, there the possibility of 
competition for investments among states, a situation that may make agreement on a 
single SADC-wide investment regime impossible.79 As the Baseline Regional Report 
notes 
In fact, evidence from interviews suggests that investment competition among member 
states remains high, and so there has been difficulty in gaining consensus on a regional 
investment policy framework. Member states will be reluctant to harmonise where this 
impacts their ability to compete and where it is not in the national interest to do so.80 
Fourthly, the fact that the FIP does not have timelines for its implementation could also 
hinder its effective realisation.81 And finally, a critical issue is the lack of political will on 
the part of Member States to bring about an effective articulation and implementation of 
harmonisation of standards and rules. Against this background, this section considers 
both the normative and political measures that are imperative for ensuring the effective 
harmonisation of investor-state dispute resolution in the SADC. 
 
 
76 See also Baseline Summary at 11. For a detailed analysis on the general challenges facing SADC, see 
Mapuva J & Muyengwa-Mapuva L “The SADC regional bloc: what prospects for regional integration?” 
(2014) 18 Law, Democracy & Development 22 at 35; Saurombe A  “Regional integration agenda for SADC 
“caught in the winds of change” problems and prospects” (2009) 4 (2) Journal of International Commercial 
Law and Technology 100; Saurombe A  “The role of SADC institutions in implementing SADC treaty 
provisions dealing with regional integration” (2012) 15 (2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 453; 
Saurombe A “The European Union as a model for regional integration in the Southern African 
Development Community: a selective institutional comparative analysis” (2013) 17 Law, Democracy & 
Development 457. 
77 There are basically two forums, being litigation and arbitration. Litigation is non-controversial from a 
state’s point of view because a State will readily agree to it. SADC State practice shows that states provide 
more for litigation than for international arbitration. 
78 See for example Baseline Summary at 11. 
79 See for example Baseline Regional Report at 54 where it is said “In fact, evidence from interviews 
suggests that investment competition among member states remains high, and so there has been 
difficulty in gaining consensus on a regional investment policy framework. Member states will be 
reluctant to harmonise where this impacts their ability to compete and where it is not in the national 
interest to do so”.  
80 Baseline Summary at 54. 
81 Baseline Summary at 11. 
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4.1 Normative measures 
In view of aligning the provisions of the FIP, the Model BIT and States’ investment 
codes, it is important to consider the following proposed measures.  
The first proposed measure is that the alternative dispute resolution provisions 
of Article 29(4)(a) of the Model BIT be incorporated into the FIP.82 Based on the 
decisions in Stati & others v Republic of Kazakhstan,83 Kilic v Tukmenistan,84 and Tulip 
Real Estate v Republic of Turkey,85 should it be necessary to retain in the FIP a cooling-
off period or other pre-condition to arbitration, such provision should be carefully 
worded in clear and unequivocal language. 
Secondly, the exhaustion of local remedies provisions of Article 29(4)(b) of the 
Model BIT in this regard should be incorporated into the FIP. In this respect, it is 
important to include a timeframe for an investor to await a verdict from a court after 
commencement of litigation.86 The exhaustion of local remedies is an established rule of 
international law, and such provision is, therefore, not controversial.87  
Thirdly, the transparency provisions in Articles 28(12) and 29(17) of the Model 
BIT should be incorporated in the FIP. 88 This point speaks to the standard of fairness 
and openness of adjudicative proceedings, and is in accordance with international 
standards.89  
82 The provision states “An Investor may submit a claim to arbitration pursuant to this Agreement, 
provided that:  (a)  six months have elapsed since the Notice of Intent was filed with the State Party and 
no solution has been reached”. 
83  Anatolie Stati & others v The Republic of Kazakhstan SCC Arbitration (Case 116/2010) Award of 19 
December 2013. This decision contrasts directly with, Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development 
Netherlands B.V. v Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No. 11/28 Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue, 
and Award of 10 March 2014.  
84 Kilic Insaat Ithalat Ihracat Sanayi Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Turkmenistan ICSID Case No. ARB 10/1 
Award of 2 July 2013 at 73 para 6.3.12 - 74 para 6.3.15. 
85 Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v Republic of Turkey ICSID Case No. 
11/28 Decision on Bifurcated Jurisdictional Issue at 35 para 135. 
86 This provision states “An Investor may submit a claim to arbitration pursuant to this Agreement, 
provided that: (a)  …. (b)  the Investor or Investment, as appropriate, (i)  has first submitted a claim 
before the domestic courts of the Host State for the purpose of pursuing local remedies, after the 
exhaustion of any administrative remedies, relating to the measure underlying the claim under this 
Agreement, and a resolution has not been reached within a reasonable period of time from its submission 
to a local court of the Host State; or  (ii)  the Investor demonstrates to a tribunal established under this 
Agreement that there are no reasonably available legal remedies capable of providing effective remedies 
of the dispute concerning the underlying measure, or the legal remedies provide no reasonable possibility 
of such remedies in a reasonable period of time.” 
87 Even Article 26 of the ICSID Convention allows a State to make the exhaustion of local remedies a pre-
condition for its consent to arbitration.   
88 Art 28|(12) and 29(17)  FIP. 
89 See for example Article 6 of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Arbitrations of 
2014. 
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   Fourthly, if States wish to manage treaty shopping,90 Article 26 of the Model BIT 
should be incorporated into the FIP.91 The use of shell companies can be avoided by 
phrasing the definition of “an investor” to exclude investors who do not have 
substantive or substantial activities in their home State.92 If the FIP, BITs and 
investment codes have the same investor-state dispute resolution and substantive 
provisions (such as, “Most Favoured Nation” and “Fair and Equitable Treatment” 
clauses), the incentive for treaty shopping should be reduced.93 
   Fifthly, Article 27 of the FIP should be retained as it provides an investor with a 
fair right of access to the courts of a host State.94 The Article complies with Article 4(c) 
of the SADC Treaty, which requires Member States to conform to the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law.95 The concept of the rule of law entails 
access to the courts and the right to be heard.96 In turn, the right to be heard 
encompasses the right to a fair hearing before a person is deprived of an interest, right 
or legitimate expectation.97 Therefore, a decision or even a law which violates this rule 
90 Treaty shopping is a practice whereby an investor selects a State wherein it has no economic activities 
as its State of incorporation. The purpose of this selection is to benefit from the BIT(s) which the selected 
State has with the State (s) wherein the investor intends to do business. The recent case of Yukos 
Universal Limited (Isle of Man) v The Russian Federation Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
of 30 November 2009 PCA Case No AA 227 shows that a tribunal will not disqualify treaty-shopping if 
such practice is not prohibited by the relevant treaty.  
91 Article 26(2) of the Model BIT states “Subject to prior notification and consultation with the other State 
Party, a State Party may at any time deny the benefits of this Agreement to an investor of another Party 
that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investors if investors of a non-Party own or 
control the enterprise and the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the 
Party under whose law it is constituted or organised”.  
With regard to the “prior notice” requirement, it must be noted that recent decisions have ruled that the 
provisions must be invoked before a dispute arises between the parties: prior notice must have been 
given before the dispute arose that the investor will be denied benefits. This provision is also contained in 
Article 17 of the USA Model BIT, Article 18 of the Canada Model BIT, Article 17 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) and Article 1113 of the NAFTA (which are similar to Article 26 of the Model BIT). For recent 
cases on this issue see Anatolie Stati v Republic of Kazakhstan SCC Arbitration (case 116/2010) Award of 
19 December 2013 at 162 para 745; and Liman Caspian Oil BV v Republic of Kazakhstan (ICSID Case No. 
07/14) Award of 22 June 2010 at 60 paras 224 -225. Both cases dealt with Article 17 of the ECT.  
92 See Model BIT at 11 and 14. 
93 But this submission does not ignore the fact that an investment code can be easily amended, unlike a 
BIT. Legislation can be amended at any time in accordance with the requisite parliamentary procedures, 
while a treaty requires the consent of both States to amend. Even if a treaty is terminated, its provisions 
may remain in force for years (see for example Article 12(3) of the South Africa Zimbabwe BIT which has 
a survival period of 20 years). Therefore a BIT provides a more stable regime than an investment code 
since it is not easily altered. 
94 This provision states  “State Parties shall ensure that investors have the right of access to the courts, 
judicial and administrative tribunals, and other authorities competent under the laws of the Host State for 
redress of their grievances in relation to any matter concerning any investment including judicial review 
of measures relating to expropriation or nationalisation and determination of compensation in the event 
of expropriation or nationalisation”. 
95 Mike Campbell Pvt Ltd & 78 others v Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe SADC (T) Case No 2/2007 
Main judgment at 26. 
96 Mike Campbell case at 26. 
97 Mike Campbell case at 35. 
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is ultra vires and amounts to a denial of justice.98 Denial of justice may violate the fair 
and equitable treatment standard, thereby exposing a State to claims for breach 
thereof.99  
   Sixthly, it is suggested that the provisions of Article 29(4)(d) of the Model BIT 
regarding prescription of claims be incorporated into the FIP. 
   Seventhly, the inclusion of Article 28(3)(a) of the Model BIT in the FIP should be 
considered.100 This novel provision enables a home state to intervene on behalf of an 
investor against a host State, and will benefit investors who may not have the financial 
resources to arbitrate against a host state. 
   Eighthly, it is suggested that the SADC should take a policy stance as to whether 
the FIP must provide for arbitration or not. If it is decided that the FIP must provide for 
arbitration, then the next consideration is whether to provide for international and/or 
local arbitration or not. The next consideration is whether States must provide consent 
to arbitration in advance,101 or make the decision to grant or refuse consent when a 
dispute arises.102 The former approach, where a State consents to arbitration in 
advance, suits an investor, because it gives an investor a guarantee that arbitration will 
take place if the investor wants it. On the other hand, it does not suit a State which does 
not want arbitration, or is unsure which arbitration policy to adopt, or which may in the 
near future not want it. 
The second approach is suitable for States that prefer the flexibility of using 
arbitration when they so wish, without being bound to do so all the time. Due to its non-
committal nature, this approach may suit States which do not prefer arbitration 
(especially international arbitration), because it gives a State the flexibility to decide 
when to arbitrate and when not to. The approach also suits States which are undecided 
on the issue, since they do not have to make a final commitment to international 
arbitration immediately, but rather they can decide on a case by case basis. This 
proposal allows States to provide for arbitration, without committing to making it 
happen in the future. This flexible approach may be best suited in the SADC context, 
assuming that not all States are in favour of international arbitration, or that some 
States may be unsure what position to adopt towards international arbitration.103 
98 Mike Campbell case at 35-37. 
99 For a recent case see Franck Charles Arif v the Republic of Moldova (ICSID ARB No 11/23) Award of 8 
April 2013. 
100 This Article states that: “Subject to the provisions of paragraph 28.4, a State Party may submit a claim 
to arbitration seeking damages for an alleged breach of this Agreement on behalf of an Investor or 
Investment…” 
101 Examples of advance consent provisions in regional treaties with advance consent are Article 26(3)(a) 
of the ECT, and Article 1122(1) of the NAFTA Treaty. 
102 This is the approach adopted by Mozambique and Tanzania in their investment codes. See Table 1 in 
Section 3 above. 
103 State practice as seen in investment codes may lend support to this view. 
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   In the event that a decision to provide for international arbitration is made, it is 
recommended that provision be made for the use of the ICSID Additional Facility, as this 
will enable investors from non-ICSID States, such as South Africa, to access ICSID 
arbitration if the host State is an ICSID Member State.104 This will also reduce the 
prospect of treaty shopping. On this point, it is also recommended that UNCITRAL 
arbitration be retained as an option to ICSID arbitration, as is currently the position.105 
Finally, in the event that international arbitration is removed from the FIP by the 
deletion of article 28, then the local courts of member should ideally be placed in such a 
position that those investors who cannot access international arbitration via BITS or 
investment agreements will have confidence in them. This may entail inter alia 
addressing the challenges raised by the American Department of State as indicated 
above. 
4.2 Political measures 
The socio-political context of the promotion of investment in the SADC is an important 
factor. Beyond the normative issues, the success or otherwise of the FIP will largely 
depend on the willingness of Member States to provide the right political environment 
for its operations. Some of these measures are discussed below. 
   Firstly, there is the need to commit to principles of good governance and 
democracy. Although six SADC Member States feature in the top ten best governed 
countries in Africa according to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG),106 a 
number of concerns about the levels of democratic governance in the region still 
remain. As indicated above, there are issues regarding judicial independence and 
transparency in some Member States, such as, Angola, Mozambique and Zambia.  
   According to the Freedom House Report (2014), four SADC Member States are 
regarded as “not free”107 and six are regarded as “partly free”.108 Political instability, 
fraudulent elections, conflicts, and violation of human rights are some of the key 
problems. These issues are capable of undercutting the impact of the FIP in promoting 
trade and investment in the region. In this regard, it is imperative that the SADC 
promote adherence to democratic values and principles in the region. As Mapuva and 
Muyengwa-Mapuva rightly point out, democracy is important for the attainment of 
integration, and that lack of democracy negatively affects integration efforts.109 This will 
104 Article 2 of the Additional Facility Rules 2006. The Rules are available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFR_English-final.pdf (accessed 30 august 2014). 
105 This is because UNCITRAL arbitration is available to investors of all nationalities, since only consent 
and not treaty membership is required for UNCITRAL arbitration (see Article 1 of the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules 2010). 
106 They are Mauritius (1), Botswana (2), Seychelles (4), South Africa (5), Namibia (6) and Lesotho (10). 
See http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/iiag/ (accessed 2 September 2014). 
107 These are Angola, Zimbabwe, the DRC, and Swaziland. See 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/MapofFreedom2014.pdf (accessed 20 September 
2014). 
108 These are Malawi, Madagascar, Mozambique, Zambia, Seychelles and Tanzania.  
109 Mapuva & Muyengwa-Mapuva (2014) at 36. 
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require serious commitment to the SADC and AU guidelines and normative standards 
on democratic governance, and the sanctioning of errant Member States. 
               Secondly, there is the need to establish a dedicated SADC or State level 
“investment ombud” or other office dedicated to facilitate the effective implementation 
of the resolution of investment dispute issues.110 Such unit should be tasked with 
ensuring compliance with the standards set out in national investment codes or the 
amended FIP, and to also report on the progress of implementation and challenges 
thereto. It could, for example, be composed of civil society representatives, retired 
judges, academics, and lawyers, with the mandate of resolving disputes (with or without 
an appeal or review mechanism) as well as of advising States or the SADC on how best 
to enhance the standards of investor-state dispute resolution measures. The 
establishment of this office will go a long way to not only adding substance to the goal of 
an effective harmonisation framework, but also enhancing the SADC institutional 
processes.  
   Thirdly, there is the need for stronger synergy among the critical stakeholders – 
the SADC, Member States and civil society. Such collaboration should be aimed at 
creating awareness on the imperative of the FIP, and also encouraging adherence to the 
salient provisions on investor-State dispute resolution in Member States. This will 
require engagement with the business community, especially by the incorporation of 
these standards into legal and business training and practice. In addition, there is the 
important need to work closely with the legal fraternity in the SADC Member States on 
issues relating to awareness of, and alignment of national legal practice with, FIP 
measures. 
Lastly, SADC institutions must be properly aligned to deliver on integration. A 
critical point in this respect is that the SADC Summit, which is composed of heads of 
state and government, has too much power over all other institutions.111 Writing in the 
context of the beleaguered SADC Tribunal, Saurombe observes 
Evidence from the dissolution of the SADC Tribunal clearly shows that SADC institutions 
are not independent of the influence of Member States. Furthermore, key institutions 
within the organisation should work in harmony and exercise their powers in a manner 
that reflects the common agenda of the regional body. The SADC Summit is clearly 
playing a bullying role on the institutions which report to it.112 
 
Such concentration of powers in one body is clearly antithetical to the development of 
regional integration processes. It is, therefore, essential that the SADC Summit find ways 
of devolving powers to other organs of the organisation. In the context of the FIP, the 
body should endow the SADC Secretariat with the requisite competences to formulate 
110 For an example of an investment ombud, see http://www.i-ombudsman.or.kr/eng/etc/site.jsp 
(accessed 4 September 2014). 
111 See for example Saurombe (2013) at 465. 
112 Saurombe (2012) at 476. 
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and implement guidelines for the attainment of the FIP. This includes the establishment 
of the “ombud” suggested above. 
5  CONCLUSION 
Until such time that States adjust their investment laws, policies and practices to be in 
accordance with the FIP or other SADC level instrument or policy, different and varying 
regimes for the resolution of investment disputes will remain. The first will be regulated 
by the Member States’ investment codes. The second will be regulated by BITs entered 
into by the States. The third will be in terms of investor-State agreements. The fourth 
will be regulated by the FIP at SADC level. These arrays of option available to an 
investor do not bode well for harmonisation, because they defeat the objective of having 
a single, SADC wide investment regime. First, this may lead to treaty shopping.113 
Second, local investors may be worse off with respect to the Investor-State Dispute 
Resolution Forum, especially in situations where investment codes provide for dispute 
resolution in local courts only, while BITs provide for international arbitration and also 
provide more rights for investors. This in turn may also lead to local investors using 
treaty shopping as a means of suitably positioning themselves. Considering that States 
need both local and foreign investments, the rationale for discriminating against local 
investors is hardly justifiable. 
   This article has considered some of the underlying issues on the feasibility of 
effective harmonisation of investment laws and policies in the SADC. The different 
approaches of Member States to investor-state dispute resolution remain a major 
concern, which can be better addressed through some normative and political 
interventions. The article suggested a number of amendments to the FIP and the need 
for Member States to demonstrate the requisite political will for creating a favourable 
climate for the resolution of investor-state disputes. As raised by the American 
Department of State, some local courts of the SADC Member States face various 
challenges which may affect their efficiency and attractiveness to investors. Such 
challenges should be addressed to win investor confidence. 
Overall and in conclusion, the road to the creation of a single investment regime 
for the SADC will not be an easy one. States have and can meet the challenges discussed 
above, only if they invest the right amount of political will and commitment.  
 
113 See Model BIT at 13, under commentary regarding “investor”. The recent Yukos case shows that 
nationals of a State can incorporate entities abroad, and then use them to conduct business in the home 
State. In the event of a dispute with the home state, they then sue their home State, but in the name of 
their “foreign” entities. The Model BIT proposes that this practice be prohibited, and that shell companies 
must have substantial or substantive business operations in the State of incorporation (see the Model BIT 
for the definition of an “investor” at p11, commentary at 14, and Article 26(2)). 
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